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Abstract and Keywords
An early stylized fact of development economics is that low-income countries 
have large differences in output per worker across sectors, and the movement of 
workers from low- to high-productivity sectors—structural transformation—is a 
key driver of growth. Historically, manufacturing has been the key driver of 
structural transformation. It can employ large numbers of unskilled workers, is 
capable of productivity gains and produces tradeable products allowing 
economies of scale and specialization. But manufacturing growth in Africa has 
lagged behind other regions, leading some observers to question Africa’s ability 
to catch up. This view overlooks such emerging industries as ICT, tourism, food 
processing, horticulture, and new services exports, which share many 
characteristics with manufacturing. These “industries without smokestacks” are 
beginning to propel growth in Africa much as traditional manufacturing did in 
other, fast growing regions.
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1. Introduction
Structural transformation in Africa has become a hot topic. Over the last five 
years, the African Development Bank and the UN Economic Commission for 
Africa have expressed concerns about the pattern and pace of structural change 
in the region. The African Union (2015), in its Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, 
has called for the economic transformation of the continent, and the Africa 
Center for Economic Transformation has published its first Africa 
Transformation Report (ACET, 2014). The reason for this rising concern is clear. 
Structural change—the movement of workers from lower to higher productivity 
employment—has contributed far less to growth in Africa than in other fast-
growing developing regions (McMillan, Rodrik, and Verduzco-Gallo 2014; de 
Vries, Timmer, and de Vries 2013).
Historically, industry, particularly manufacturing, is the sector on which 
economies have relied early in the process of structural transformation. Africa’s 
experience with industrialization, however, has been disappointing. In 2014, the 
average share of manufacturing in GDP in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was about 
10 per cent, unchanged from the 1970s. Not surprisingly, Africa’s slow pace of 
industrialization has caused observers to question the durability of its growth 
prospects (Rodrik 2014).
At the same time, changes in transport costs and information and 
communications technology are shifting the boundaries of industry. When 
today’s system of economic statistics was first drawn up there was little 
confusion over  (p.2) what industry was: mining, manufacturing, utilities, and 
construction. Of these, manufacturing—‘smokestack industry’—was regarded as 
the key driver of structural transformation. Today, a wide range of services and 
agro-industrial products, including horticultural products, has emerged. These 
activities have many features in common with manufacturing.1 They are tradable 
and have high value added per worker. Like manufacturing, they benefit from 
technological change and productivity growth. Some exhibit scale and 
agglomeration economies (Ebling and Janz 1999; Ghani and Kharas 2010). We 
call them ‘industries without smokestacks’.
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In 2015, the Brookings Institution and UNU-WIDER launched a joint research 
project entitled Industries without Smokestacks: Implications for Africa’s 
Industrialization. The objective of the project was to help African policy makers 
develop a better understanding of industries without smokestacks and their 
potential to contribute to growth enhancing structural change. This book 
presents the results of that research. It is structured in three main parts. Part I 
presents seven essays that survey core aspects of tradable services and agro-
industrial value chains at the global level. Part II consists of nine country-level 
studies from Africa. Part III examines the opportunities for and constraints on 
more rapid growth of industries without smokestacks offered by Africa’s 
regional communities. This introductory chapter reviews common themes, and a 
concluding chapter explores the implications of the studies in this volume for 
public policy at the national, regional, and global level.
2. The Problem of Structural Transformation in Africa
One of the earliest ‘stylized facts’ of development economics is that low-income 
countries have large differences in output per worker across sectors. Structural 
transformation—the shift of labour from lower productivity to higher 
productivity ‘modern’ sectors—is, therefore, often a key driver of growth (Lewis 
1954; Chenery 1986). When strong within-sector productivity growth combines 
with rapid movement of labour into higher productivity sectors—the pattern of 
structural transformation seen in East Asia over the last fifty years—very rapid 
growth of output per worker is the outcome (McMillian and Rodrik 2012).
Because it is a relatively labour-intensive, high productivity sector, industry is 
historically where workers have first moved in the course of structural 
transformation (Chenery 1986). Industry is also a powerful engine of within-
sector productivity growth. There is evidence that modern manufacturing  (p.3) 
industries—unlike agriculture or traditional services—converge to global best 
practice productivity levels ‘unconditionally’, regardless of geographical 
disadvantages, poor institutions, or bad policies (Rodrik 2013). Between 1950 
and 2006, about half of the catch-up by developing countries to advanced 
economy productivity levels was due to rising productivity within industry 
combined with structural transformation out of agriculture (Duarte and 
Restuccia 2010).
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With this pattern of structural transformation, economy-wide growth depends 
crucially on the pace of industrialization and its capacity to absorb labour. The 
contribution that structural-change can make to sustained growth is necessarily 
self-limiting. The low-income elasticity of demand for agricultural products 
makes a movement of labour out of agriculture inevitable during the process of 
development. The labour that is released has to be absorbed in other activities. 
If productivity is not growing in the other sectors, economy-wide growth 
ultimately will stall. Historically, where manufacturing has stagnated, and 
structural transformation has mainly involved reallocation of workers into lower 
productivity sectors, aggregate per capita income growth has lagged (Duarte 
and Restuccia 2010).
Because it has the greatest differences across sectors in output per worker, 
Africa is the developing region with the most to gain from structural 
transformation. However, despite two decades of solid economic growth, this 
potential for structural transformation has not been fully realized. In fact, from 
1990 through 1999, structural transformation in Africa was ‘growth reducing.’ 
Africa’s higher productivity sectors, including manufacturing, failed to generate 
enough jobs to absorb a rapidly growing labour force, and the share of workers 
employed in high productivity sectors declined, reducing aggregate growth of 
output per worker (McMillan, Rodrik, and Verduzco-Gallo 2014; de Vries et al. 
2013). Labour in Africa began to move from agriculture into more productive 
employment after 2000, but 80 per cent of workers have moved into retail trade 
and distribution (de Vries et al. 2013), not into industry.
Mia Ellis, Margaret McMillan and Jed Silver examine the case of structural 
transformation in Tanzania in detail in Chapter 15. They find that that close to 
80 per cent of Tanzania’s growth in labour productivity over the period 2002–12 
is attributable to structural change. However, the structural change that took 
place was primarily due to growth in employment in small manufacturing firms 
and retail, wholesale, and food and beverages services in the informal economy. 
Services productivity in Tanzania is relatively high at 3.5 times that of 
agriculture, while average labour productivity in manufacturing is more than 
seven times that of the agricultural sector. Services productivity in Rwanda was 
even higher—manufacturing labour productivity was five times agriculture but 
services were more than ten times agriculture, according to Ggombe and 
Newfarmer’s unweighted calculation in Chapter 16.
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 (p.4) This structural shift from agriculture to services differs from the 
development experience of other regions. In a recent paper, Rodrik, Diao, and 
McMillan (2017) find that growth-enhancing structural change in Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Senegal, and Tanzania has been accompanied by negative labour 
productivity growth in non-agricultural sectors of the economy. Ellis, McMillan, 
and Silver find that within-sector productivity growth was negative in six out of 
ten modern sectors of the Tanzanian economy in 2002–12. Rodrik et al. suggest 
that in contrast to East Asia, where both structural change and within-sector 
labour productivity growth contributed strongly to overall growth, structural 
change in African countries may be driven mainly from the demand side by 
external transfers or increased agricultural incomes. As incomes rise, demand 
increases for a range of ‘urban products,’ including simple manufactures and 
services. Under these circumstances, labour productivity in the modern sector 
may decline, as less productive firms are drawn into production for the domestic 
market. In Chapter 16, Ggombe and Newfarmer find that productivity in four of 
eight non-agricultural activities in Rwanda declined somewhat between 2005–
14, as the urban labour force grew.
Another difference that distinguishes Africa from Asia’s pattern of structural 
transformation concerns underlying demographics. Between 2000–16, for 
example, the labour force grew by 0.8 per cent in East Asia and 1.6 per cent in 
South Asia—while in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) it grew far more rapidly at 2.9 
per cent annually. The median age in Africa is 18, seven years younger than in 
South Asia (Fox et al. 2017). Because jobs created in off-farm activities were 
insufficient to absorb these rates of labour force growth, labour had no choice 
but to stay on the land or seek informal employment. Expanding population 
pressure on the land weighs heavily on labour productivity in agriculture, and 
even modestly higher wages off farm are likely to be sufficient to entice young 
workers to move.
One symptom of this phenomenon has been ‘premature urbanization’. 
Demographics have accelerated rural-urban migration such that Africa is likely 
to reach 50 per cent urbanization rates at half the per capita income levels that 
Latin America did, and one-third the levels of East Asia. Since many of these new 
workers lack skills and jobs, their productivity in the urban economy is likely to 
be quite low. Many low-income migrants are earning a living in household 
enterprises and SMEs, a trend that is likely to continue (Fox et al. 2017). Clearly, 
a major challenge for African governments is to promote the growth of higher 
value-added activities capable of absorbing the large numbers of unskilled and 
moderately skilled workers leaving agriculture.
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Figure 1.1.  Has Africa’s manufacturing 
peaked too soon?
The export-led, mass manufacturing model used with great success in Asia over 
the past fifty years represents one potential path for Africa toward structural 
transformation and job growth. However, changes in manufacturing technology 
and in the global market for manufactured goods may pose new  (p.5) 
challenges. The first wave of industrializers such as Britain and Germany had 
more than 30 per cent of their labour force in manufacturing before industry as 
a share of GDP began to fall. On average, countries across all income levels now 
have a lower manufacturing share than before, and they reach their peak 
employment and value-added shares at a lower income than in previous decades 
(Rodrik 2016; Ghani and O’Connell 2014). Hallward-Dreimeier and Nayyar (2017) 
show this phenomena was even greater for employment shares (Figure 1.1). 
These trends allow more limited space for employment-creating 
industrialization. At the same time, changes in the global economy may create 
an opportunity for a different path of structural transformation.
3. A Different Path: Global 
Trends, Opportunities and 
Constraints
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As Africa enters its next phase of development, it confronts a global economy 
substantially different from previous ‘late industrializers’. On the one hand, the 
exceptionally buoyant trade environment of the 1990s has given way to a slower 
growth environment for world trade in the new century. World trade  (p.6) 
growth had ranged between 1.5 and 3.0 times world income growth for nearly 
two decades prior to 2000. Since the turn of the century, there have been several 
years when world trade has grown at about the same pace as world income (see 
Hoekman 2015). On the other hand, many of the forces that have contributed to 
this slowdown in world trade have created new opportunities for Africa. 
Particularly since 2000, technological change has accelerated, lowering the cost 
of communication and, no less important, creating new forms of communication 
such as internet platforms and smart phones. By lowering the costs of cross-
border financial transactions, it has opened the way for digital commerce. 
Technological change has also lowered the cost of shipping via sea and air, as 
well as passenger air travel. The essays in Part I of this volume suggest that four 
global trends present new opportunities for Africa: a revolution in trade in 
services, the marked change toward ‘servicification’ of manufacturing 
production, the rise in global value chains, and major developments in 
technology markets may permit Africa to leapfrog to transformative 
technologies. In each of these four areas, major progress in technology and 
rapid reductions in costs are creating new opportunities for Africa; consider 
each in turn.
3.1. A Global Services Revolution
Economists have traditionally viewed services as the quintessential ‘non-traded’ 
activity. This meant that trade in services depended on the physical movement of 
service providers or customers to the location in which the service was to be 
given. As Bernard Hoekman argues in Chapter 8, the need for such movement 
has been declining as the result of changes in technology that allow many 
services to be digitized and provided across borders through ICT networks.
Since the 1980s, global trade in services has grown faster than merchandize 
trade. Service exports from developing countries have almost tripled in the last 
ten years, growing by 11 per cent annually (World Bank 2010). Modern service 
exports (computer and information services, financial services, business services 
and communication) are also growing much faster than traditional service 
exports such as travel, tourism and transport.
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While sub-Saharan Africa trails other developing regions in the growth of 
services exports, they have nevertheless grown at about 10 per cent per year 
between 1998–2015. This is more than six times faster than merchandise 
exports. Exports of services are about 11 per cent of the total exports of the 
average SSA country, so the potential for expansion exists, although levels vary 
widely across countries.2 Importantly, services trade is particularly relevant  (p.
7) for Africa’s many land locked countries where, unlike in goods trade, 
transportation costs do not significantly raise export costs.
Modern services are a critical input into downstream industries—and as such a 
potential driver of productivity gains in other sectors. For example, 
telecommunications are vital to the operations of manufacturers, service 
providers, and primary products suppliers. Most large businesses, even in the 
poorest countries of Africa, now have websites. These form an essential window 
onto the firm’s goods and/or services for the outside world, and as such are vital 
for sales. Financial services are crucial to business efficiency across all aspects 
of the economy. These services and a multiplicity of others—ranging from retail, 
real estate, and business services to engineering, architectural, consultant, 
accounting, computer and ICT and legal services to name a few—are essential 
inputs into all other sectors of the economy.
The impact of services on manufacturing productivity is considerable. At average 
level of services use, a 10 per cent increase in services productivity is associated 
with an increase in manufacturing productivity of 0.32 per cent in Burundi, 0.41 
in Kenya, 0.34 in Rwanda, 0.67 in Tanzania and 0.55 in Uganda (Hoekman and 
Shepherd 2015).
3.2. The ‘Servicification’ of Manufacturing
Bernard Hoekman describes in Chapter 8 the trend toward ‘servicification’ of 
global manufacturing. He argues that much of manufacturing is undergoing a 
process of servicification, involving a focus on the provision (sale) of the services 
that are generated by products as opposed to simply the fabrication and sale of 
tangible goods. Distinguishing between manufacturing and services sectors is 
rapidly becoming less meaningful. For example, back office operations and 
accounting, which were previously integrated components of manufacturing 
enterprises can now be spun off and subcontracted. At the same time, services 
sector firms have become larger, providing a range of specialized services; e.g., 
engineering design work, legal services, and accounting.
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Figure 1.2.  Manufacturing as a share of 
GDP on average declines over four 
decades
Source: Authors’ calculation from WDI 
(April 2017).
These changes in the boundaries of manufacturing are in part responsible for 
the ‘premature deindustrialization’ described above.3 Historically, the 
relationship between manufacturing and per capita income has had an  (p.8) 
‘inverted U’ shape as shown in Figure 1.2. In the early stages of development, 
growth in income is associated with very rapid increases of the share of 
manufacturing in total employment. As incomes and real wages rise and skills 
develop, the relative importance of manufacturing peaks; countries moving 
toward upper middle-income levels diversify into more skill-intensive activities, 
including services.
As a result of servicification 
interacting with technological 
advances in production, this 
historic relation has changed. 
The average share of 
manufacturing in national 
output—for all countries at all 
levels of national income—has 
fallen steadily over the last four 
decades (Figure 1.2). Where in 
the 1980s, average shares of 
manufacturing in GDP peaked 
at nearly 20 per cent of GDP, in 
today’s world the average peak 
is about 14 per cent.
3.3. The Rise of Global Value 
Chains
Services out-sourcing is only 
one part of the story. Another part is off-shoring and the emergence of global 
value chains (GVCs). In many manufacturing and service activities, a production 
process can be decomposed into a series of steps or tasks (Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg 2006). Sharp declines in transport and communication costs have 
enabled companies to relocate selected tasks to low-wage countries around the 
world. One indication of this fragmentation of production is the rising proportion 
of world trade in intermediate inputs. Trade in intermediates, according to 
Miroudot et al. (2009), amounted  (p.9) to 56 per cent of goods trade and 73 per 
cent of services trade in OECD countries in the period from 1995 to 2005.4
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While this trend may be maturing—and in that sense has contributed to the 
slower world trade growth relative to income after 20005—it has also given rise 
to productivity gains. Based on a panel estimation covering thirteen sectors in 
forty countries over fifteen years, Mattoo et al. (2017), found that participation 
in global value chains is a significant driver of labour productivity. An increase 
by 10 per cent in the level of global value chain participation increased average 
productivity by close to 1.7 per cent.
The essays in Part II show the extent to which value chains are already taking 
root in Africa. Tourism and horticulture are prime examples. In Chapter 4 Jack 
Dailey and Gary Gereffi describe the structure of Africa’s tourism value chain. 
Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal all actively participate in global horticultural value 
chains. In manufacturing, even though tariffs and other border barriers remain 
substantially higher than in ‘factory Asia’, the great majority of firms that export 
are also substantial importers (Spray 2017; Spray and Wolf this volume; von 
Euxkull 2016).
Baldwin (2011) has argued that the increasing role of GVCs in world trade is a 
double-edged sword for developing regions like Africa. On the one hand, it has 
created an avenue through which countries can industrialize at a much earlier 
stage of development, as lead firms choose to off-shore fragments of the 
production value chain to countries where labour is cheaper or where other 
locational advantages confer a competitive cost advantage on the whole GVC.6
Participation in GVCs may also allow suppliers in developing countries to meet 
standards and regulations that allow access to rich country markets; it may 
permit imports under privileged tariff treatment for intra-firm trade; or it may 
facilitate use of network technology that would not otherwise be available. 
However, the second consequence is that in a world of GVC-dominated trade in 
which production is allocated to the location with lowest cost, countries that try 
to industrialize through import-substitution policies behind high tariff walls are 
unlikely to ever reduce their costs to the point of being competitive on global 
markets.
The rise of global value chains has contributed to the reduction in the role of 
manufacturing. Baldwin, et al. (2014) argue that the ‘smile curve’ across 
production stages has substantially deepened over time (Figure 1.3). Out-
sourcing  (p.10) and off-shoring of production to low-wage countries has meant 
that the value added share in manufacturing has declined relative to services-
based tasks such as design work, R&D, and marketing, often associated with 
lead firms.
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Figure 1.3.  The changing relationship 
between manufacturing and services
GVCs are also important outside 
manufacturing. The transport of 
fresh fruit, vegetables, and 
flowers over long distances 
became possible with the 
development of ‘cold chains’ 
linking production and 
consumption points. Lead firms 
that coordinate vertical supply 
chains dominate the industry.7
Daly and Gereffi highlight in 
Chapter 4 the importance of 
lead firms that connect 
customers and service 
providers, including both global and national enterprises, in Africa’s tourism 
value chain.
3.4. Disruptive New Technologies
The fourth and final change in the global environment referred to above is that 
the pace of technological innovation and diffusion is accelerating—creating vast 
opportunities to leap-frog and in some cases capture first mover advantages. 
Sally Murray in Chapter 2 points to clusters of technology that offer a range of 
new and unprecedented applications in Africa. She argues that some have the 
potential for overcoming distance through e-commerce, mobile money, business 
process outsourcing (BPO), and lowering transport costs (for example drones). 
Others are critical to increasing labour productivity—access to distance 
education and ICT, as well as new technologies (GMO crops). Some, particularly 
solar power, have the potential to reduce energy costs. The bottom  (p.11) line 
is that Africa has abundant opportunities to adapt newly created technologies to 
its own situation (mobile money and drone transport), develop and expand 
technologies that make intensive use of Africa’s resource endowments (solar 
power), and use these to create new and unforeseen sources of competitive 
advantage. In some cases, these new technologies will allow Africa to leap-frog 
technologies in the high-income countries, most likely in network industries 
where the high fixed cost of investments constrains adoption of latest 
technologies in richer economies.
4. Africa’s Emerging Industries without Smokestacks
In Africa, three major sectors have benefited from the global changes described 
above: agro-industrial and horticultural value chains; tourism; and business and 
trade services (including information- and communications-based (ICT) services 
and transport and logistics). These activities are among the most rapidly 
growing sectors of the global economy and are increasingly important across a 
wide range of countries in Africa.
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4.1. Agro-Industry and Horticulture
Emiko Fukase and Will Martin point out in Chapter 5 that one of the stylized 
facts of structural transformation is that while the share of the agricultural 
sector in an economy typically declines with economic growth, the share of agro-
processing in GDP tends to increase. Consumption shifts from starchy staple 
foods to foods such as vegetables, fruits, meats, and food products that make 
use of more services. They also note that lower transport and communication 
costs have created new opportunities for developing countries. Once efficient 
logistics are in place, countries with suitable agro-ecological conditions can 
potentially produce high-value products, such as cut flowers and fresh 
vegetables, which formerly needed to be produced near their point of 
consumption.
Between 1988 and 2014, world agricultural exports expanded from US$83.4 
billion to US$1,532 billion. Bulk agricultural products accounted for a small and 
declining share of world agricultural exports—decreasing from 25 per cent in 
1988 to 17 per cent in 2014. By contrast, processed and semi-processed 
agricultural products accounted for almost three-quarters of global agricultural 
exports in 2015, and horticultural exports accounted for around 12 per cent of 
global agricultural exports in 2014.8
 (p.12) Fukase and Martin find quite distinct differences between African and 
global patterns of agricultural trade. Bulk agricultural exports dominate. The 
share of processed and semi-processed agricultural products in Africa’s 
agricultural exports rose, but only to 35 per cent by 2014. The share of 
horticultural exports on the other hand more than doubled, from around 10 per 
cent in 1988–9 to 22 per cent in 2014. Fukase and Martin suggest that the 
relatively low share of agricultural processing in African economies reflects their 
relatively low incomes. In addition, they argue, Africa faces tariff escalation 
within many value chains in its export markets.
Ethiopia has achieved extraordinary success in flower exports making the 
country a global player in the sector. In Chapter 9, Mulu Gebreeyesus finds that 
over the period 2002–8 the number of flower farms grew about sixteen-fold. 
Ethiopia’s 2015–16 cut flower exports reached about US$225 million making the 
country the second largest cut-flower exporter in Africa. The successful 
discovery of the flower industry in Ethiopia was a result of private 
entrepreneurs’ experimentation, supported by active government efforts to 
identify and remove bottlenecks to the sector’s growth. Despite Ethiopia’s well-
documented success in cut flowers, exports of fruits and vegetables have 
remained marginal. Gebreeyesus argues that the lack of export dynamism in 
other horticultural products is attributable to several factors—among them the 
standards to enter developed country markets are more stringent in the fruits 
and vegetables sector than in the flower sector, and flower exports are better 
suited to air transportation.
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Horticultural exports from Senegal were modest up to 2003, but starting in 
2004, exports to Europe have grown rapidly, averaging increases of 20 per cent 
per year. In Chapter 13, Philip English argues that one of the keys to the early 
expansion of the sector was the availability of high-speed ships to bring goods to 
northern European markets. The sector was able to shift from air to maritime 
transport, significantly improving its competitiveness. Integrated multinational 
companies handle production, processing and exporting—selling either to 
wholesalers or directly to supermarkets.
Export of processed horticultural products (mainly fruits and beverages) has 
become increasingly significant in Ghana. Export earnings from the agro-
processing industry increased from US$181.1 million in 2004 to about US$902.5 
million in 2011. In Chapter 10, Nkechie Owoo and Monica Lambon-Quayefio give 
a detailed description of the fruit and juice processing value chain. Export 
production depends on four large fruit processing companies that employ capital 
intensive imported technology for fruit juice processing and run large 
commercial farms.
Haroon Bhorat and others show in Chapter 14 that over the period 2000–14 
horticulture exports outperformed aggregate export growth in South Africa. 
They show that the relatively rapid growth in horticulture products was driven 
 (p.13) by the intensification of existing export relationships and low exit rates 
from export markets, relative to other agriculture products. They suggest that 
this rapid and persistent growth is partly due to the rapid growth of South 
African FDI in the retail sector across Africa.
4.2. Tourism
Daly and Gereffi in Chapter 4 argue that tourism is an important driver of 
economic growth around the world. In 2014, the tourism industry provided an 
estimated 277 million jobs and accounted for about 9.8 per cent of global GDP. 
In part, the development impact of tourism receives too little attention because 
it is hard to measure. Ellis, McMillan, and Silver make the point in Chapter 15
that the tourism sector is made up of several different industries including but 
not limited to accommodation, food and beverage, transportation, and culture, 
sports, and recreational services. Thus, while it is possible to track tourist 
arrivals, estimates of their direct and indirect effect on output and employment 
are necessarily imprecise. The country studies suggest that they can be 
substantial.
Industries without Smokestacks and Structural Transformation in Africa
Page 14 of 29
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Royal 
Library, Copenhagen University Library; date: 20 May 2019
In 2014, 9.5 million tourists visited South Africa, by far the most in SSA. Tourism 
constitutes around 3 per cent of GDP and has been growing at the same rate as 
the economy as a whole. Bhorat and others estimate that the number of jobs 
dependent on tourism was approximately 680,000 in 2014. They further find that 
about 36 per cent of jobs in the food and beverage industry in South Africa are 
directly related to tourism, and that four industries—road passenger transport, 
food and beverage, retail and trade and accommodation for visitors—are 
responsible for 83 per cent of tourism-related jobs. Bhorat and his colleagues 
argue that tourism is an important source of shared growth in South Africa. 
Many of these jobs are low-skilled, located in towns where there is little other 
economic activity, and have a higher-than-average representation of women and 
youth.
Ellis, McMillan, and Silver estimate that in Tanzania tourism generates over 
US$1 billion in direct annual foreign exchange revenues and contributes directly 
and indirectly approximately 14 per cent of GDP. Its share of employment was 
about 3.2 per cent in 2012, larger than both transport and business services. 
They find that during 2002–12 the sector grew at roughly the same rate as GDP 
and employment, and productivity increased by approximately 50 per cent.
Tourism is Rwanda’s largest single export activity, accounting for about 23 per 
cent of total exports in 2016. Overall tourism receipts have grown by 22 per cent 
per annum over the last ten years. However, they appear to have levelled off 
since 2012. In Chapter 16, Gigombe and Newfarmer suggest that the main 
driver of tourism, gorilla trekking, is reaching full capacity and the  (p.14) 
country needs to develop additional attractions to keep the sector growing. 
Recently, government priorities have focused on meetings and conferences with 
an aim of making Rwanda a conference tourism hub within the EAC and African 
region.
Gebreeyesus finds that Ethiopia’s number of international tourist arrivals tripled 
during 2005–13 from 227,000 to 681,000. International tourist and travel 
receipts also tripled over the same period. In 2015, the travel and tourism sector 
contributed about 11.3 per cent of GDP and 9.8 per cent of employment. Antonio 
Cruz and Fausto Mafambissa find in Chapter 12 that tourism in Mozambique has 
been growing at an annual average rate of 9.1 per cent, which is higher than 
GDP growth. English documents the rise and decline of the tourism sector in 
Senegal. In the 1980s, Senegal was second only to Kenya in SSA in terms of 
tourist arrivals. However, by 2010, it was no longer among the top ten 
destinations. In 2015 tourism receipts accounted for about 11 per cent of total 
exports. The share of international tourism in GDP was about 4 per cent in 2000 
and declined toward 3 per cent in 2015.
Industries without Smokestacks and Structural Transformation in Africa
Page 15 of 29
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Royal 
Library, Copenhagen University Library; date: 20 May 2019
The country studies paint a portrait of an industry with substantial potential, and 
one that has not yet achieved its full promise. Despite a plethora of published 
tourism strategies, the country studies suggest that most governments are 
failing to implement them effectively. Perhaps the most dramatic case is Senegal 
where English argues that scepticism about the development impact of tourism 
by its long-time president Abdoulaye Wade resulted in neglect of the sector, 
including a failure to collect basic statistics. In 2009, Ethiopia’s government 
launched a tourism development policy; most of the initiatives included in the 
policy document are still in the process of implementation. In Tanzania the 
government has attempted to pursue a ‘high-value low-density’ (HVLD) tourism 
policy, designed to make Tanzania a ‘high-end’ tourist destination that caters to 
a very wealthy clientele. However, the quality of tourism services in Tanzania is 
currently too low to make this policy feasible.
4.3. Business and Trade Services
Developing countries are closing the connectivity gap—defined in terms of the 
extent of internet access and speed—with more advanced economies at a 
remarkable rate. There have been pronounced gains among developing and 
emerging economies, mostly centred on mobile telephones. In Europe in 2010 
total fixed and mobile broadband subscriptions were 54.1 per 100 inhabitants. 
This rose to 107.8 in 2015. In Africa, the gains were far more pronounced, from 
2.0 to 17.9 per 100, with the Europe/Africa ratio decreasing from 27:1 to 6:1 in 
five years.
 (p.15) These technologies will enable a far larger number of countries to enter 
service export markets, moving beyond the traditional outsourcing model. In 
Chapter 3, Claudio Frishtak writes that ‘there is an ongoing revolution in the ICT 
space with implications for the way we live, interact, consume, produce and 
manage firms, cities and other jurisdictions’. Frishtak suggests that second-
generation ICTs are changing the competitive landscape in ways that lower 
entry barriers, and new technologies will dramatically facilitate the production 
and export of services, without resort to software engineers, computer scientists 
and highly skilled professionals.
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The poster child for ICT-based services in Africa is Kenya. In Chapter 11, Dianah 
Ngui Muchai and Peter Kimuyu provide a detailed picture of Kenya’s most 
successful IT-based industry, mobile money transfer—a financial product that 
allows users to make financial transactions via the mobile phone. Kenya has the 
highest share of adults with a mobile money account (58 per cent of the 
population) in East Africa. Kenya’s wide availability of mobile devices offered a 
distribution technology for mobile financial services, in particular mobile 
banking and mobile money transfers. Most large banks have made substantial 
investments in mobile phone banking capabilities. Mobile network carriers, 
credit card processors, and online personal finance services firms were among 
the non-bank investors. In 2012, a carrier, Safaricom, teamed up with the 
Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) to launch M-Shwari, a mobile service that 
offers micro savings accounts and credit. Many small companies rely on mobile 
money for nearly all transactions or provide a service that is a derivative of the 
platform itself.
Kenya was also an early entrant into the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) 
market. BPO is the contracting of a specific business task to a third-party service 
provider. The most common examples of BPO are call centres, human resources, 
accounting and payroll outsourcing. Following the entry of a pioneer firm, 
KenCall in 2005, other firms have jumped into the market. Currently there are 
fifty BPO firms operating in Kenya providing various services such as data 
processing, digitization, transcription and call centres. Nairobi’s BPO call 
centres are small-scale, with from ten to a few hundred agents. A growing 
number of firms are offering high end services such as software development, 
programming, research and development and finance and accounting services. 
While KenCall has an international clientele, the bulk of firms, are serving the 
domestic and EAC regional markets.
Rwanda has set the goal of being the ICT hub of the East African Community, 
under the multi-phase National ICT Strategy and Plan (NICI). ICT has expanded 
rapidly in recent years, attracting 47 per cent of foreign direct investments 
between 2008 and 2011. It contributed 3 per cent of GDP in 2014. Gigombe and 
Newfarmer argue in Chapter 16 that, like many other African countries, Rwanda 
has leapfrogged from twentieth century fixed-line  (p.16) technology directly 
into twenty-first century mobile technology. Mobile phone subscriptions rose to 
70 per cent of the population in 2014. Mobile money was introduced in 2010, 
and between 2011 and 2014, mobile payments subscriptions increased from 
639,673 to 6,480,449. The government is a major consumer of ICT services. The 
Rwanda Development Board (RDB) has worked closely with technology solutions 
companies to promote the digitization of 100 services, including applications for 
birth certificates, registration and school examination fee payments. One of the 
main digitization initiatives was the establishment of electronic and mobile 
declaration of tax returns in 2011. Mobile payment of taxes was introduced in 
2015.
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Senegal was one of the earliest entrants into outsourcing in SSA. Call centres 
were the main focus; companies were able to attract better qualified employees 
than in France at one-tenth the cost. In 2000, there were thirty-five companies 
exporting IT-enabled services. By 2016, there were only nine call centres and 
they were finding it increasingly difficult to compete outside Senegal. Because 
solutions developed for Senegal are well-suited to other African contexts, export 
of software appears to be doing better. English argues that the decline of the IT-
enabled services industry in Senegal is closely related to the high cost of access. 
The principal investor in the fiber optic cables was Sonatel, the former 
parastatal privatized in 1997. Although Sonatel reduced prices significantly in 
the early 2000s, it has been able to maintain a monopoly on external 
connectivity, and the number of Internet service providers has fallen from nine 
to two. Internet access speeds are below the average for SSA and much slower 
than in Rwanda or Kenya.
Virtually all goods trade passes through a combination of air, sea, and land 
transport routes. Even services like tourism rely on reliable air and sea 
connections. Historically, the small market countries of Africa were caught in a 
vicious trap of low trading volumes, monopoly transport services, high 
uncertainty in the logistics chain and high transport costs. As a result of these 
conditions—and ‘thick borders’ associated with barriers (Brenton and Izak 2014)
—transport costs overland in Africa are substantially higher than in other parts 
of the world. For example, costs per ton transported along the Northern 
Corridor from Mobassa to Kampala average US$8 cents per ton/kilometer, as 
compared to average costs in Brazil of US$3.5 cents per ton/kilometer 
(Raballand 2016). Schlumberger and Weiskopf (2014) estimate that transport 
costs are in general 30–50 per cent higher in Africa than other developing 
countries. This has particularly affected the landlocked countries of Africa—
where typically costs (measured in days) are twice those for coastal cities—
adversely (see Arvis et al. 2010).
Reductions in transport costs, due to regional initiatives and increased 
investments, have begun to break this cycle. In East Africa, port dwell, transit 
and border processing times are 40–60 per cent less than a decade ago.  (p.17) 
Dwell times in Mobassa port have fallen from 13 to 5.8 days—while the number 
of containers has roughly doubled. Transit times through Kenya have fallen from 
four days to two days. Police roadblocks in Tanzania have been reduced from 35 
to eight. At the border crossing at Malaba, average delays have fallen from 24 
hours to four hours. As Raballand and others note in Chapter 7, with lower trade 
logistics costs, a manufacturer can change the source of inputs or the 
destination of exports or relocate production, reconfiguring their entire supply 
chain to suit production opportunities or respond to shifts in relative prices.
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Air transport in some high unit value products, such as cut flowers, can offer an 
alternative to overland transport. As with trucking, Africa suffers high 
transportation costs because of low volumes, monopoly routes, and the presence 
of high-cost state-sponsored carriers. In Chapter 6, Heinrich Bofinger notes that 
the region has about 100 million seats for both international and domestic 
travel; Brazil, by comparison, has about the same number solely for its domestic 
capacity. Similarly, the three airports serving metropolitan Washington DC in the 
US handle annually almost the same capacity as all of Africa. Lack of 
competition on most routes impedes the consolidation of the market. The use of 
high landing fees at airports—often designed to finance airport maintenance and 
expansion—drives up costs further.
This is changing. Several aggressive new airlines—notably Ethiopian and 
Emirates—are promoting Fifth Freedom market access and creating new 
competition with attendant price effects—at least in the larger markets. 
Ethiopian Airlines, Emirates, and to a far lesser extent, Turkish Airlines have 
grown at double-digit rates over the last decade (2007–15). Other smaller 
airlines—Qatar, TAAG, Air Austral, Royal Air Maroc, and Rwandair—have also 
registered double digit growth from a lower base. Rwandair, for example, has 
just negotiated new routes to the US (New York) and Europe (London and 
Brussels). This expansion has occurred at the expense of lost market share of 
the majors—British Airways, South Africa Airways. Air France, and Kenya 
Airways.
5. The Pivotal Role of Regional Trade
In Africa, where fifteen out of forty-seven countries are land-locked, trading with 
neighbours is vital. Two factors accentuate the importance of facilitating 
regional trade: the high cost of transportation and the ‘thick borders’ associated 
with high border barriers that impede trade to a far greater degree than in other 
developing regions (see Brenton and Izak 2014). Transport costs, for example, 
add roughly 50 per cent on average of goods shipment into Kigali to the landed 
cost of products in the Mobassa port. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers are generally 
higher in Africa than elsewhere, undermining the  (p.18) competitiveness of 
local producers that require imported inputs into export production. In fact, in 
both Uganda and Rwanda, exporters purchase three times more imports than 
non-trading companies, and account for most imports in both countries. As 
Chapter 18 by Stephen Karingi, Octavia Pesce, and Lily Sommner on trade in the 
East African Community vividly shows, to the extent that regional agreements 
lower the cost of transport and lower intra-regional border barriers, they 
increase the competitiveness of Africa’s industry.
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Another reason that regional trade is important is its peculiar role in structural 
transformation, particularly in the development of manufacturing. Regional 
agreements can provide opportunities to develop local manufactures based on 
locational advantages. Superior knowledge of local tastes and consumption 
patterns allows firms to tailor differentiated products to the local market, often 
using local inputs. Similarly, transport costs act as effective protection for 
production located in inland areas. No wonder products as diverse as beer, 
rebars, and cement are traded intra-regionally. Hallward-Dreimeier and Nayyar 
illustrated this dramatically by comparing the structure of exports to the world 
market to those traded in the intra-regional market. They find that the share of 
manufactured exports in total export sold to neighbouring countries was 
substantially higher their share of total exports sold to the global market.
Karingi, Pesce, and Sommer show the effects of regional agreements in 
influencing this pattern. They find, for example, that while manufactures 
constitute only 11 per cent of EAC total exports, they make up 42 per cent of 
intra-regional exports. There are two likely channels at work that underpin this 
process. The first is the emergence of intra-regional value chains, sometimes 
connected with final sales in the global market. Daly et al. (2016) explore the 
emergence of intra-regional value chains in the EAC in agro-processing, dairy, 
and tourism. A second channel may over time become even more important: 
intra-regional competition, particularly in differentiated consumer goods, may 
drive specialization and productivity gains in manufacturing at the same time it 
permits diversification in consumption patterns. Taking advantage of this 
channel of growth requires reducing border frictions and fostering competition 
that allows the emergence of ever larger and more competitive enterprises.
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Jaime de Melo, Mariem Nouar, and Jean-Marc Solleder in Chapter 19 undertake 
a comparative analysis and show that Africa has not come close to tapping the 
full potential of ‘deep integration’. They highlight the importance of culture, 
trust, and institutions—typically ignored in analyses of regional agreements—in 
determining their success in expanding trade. They calculate an ‘average 
distance ratio’, and show that for nearly all of the regional economic 
communities, trade costs have fallen faster in the regional agreements than  (p.
19) vis-à-vis the rest of the world for agricultural products, while about half of 
Africa’s regional communities show progress for manufactures. Their cross-
country regressions confirm that the membership in regional agreements 
(preferential trade agreements) indeed does have a positive effect on the export 
of manufactures and services. Furthermore, regional groupings tend to foster an 
increase in new products. Overall, these findings would augur well for the role of 
regional agreements in fostering ‘industries without smokestacks’. However, 
results to date have been disappointing because of the lack of enforcement of 
deep integration provisions and aspirations for more complete trade 
liberalization. They also highlight the substantial underperformance of African 
regional agreements in comparison with Asian and Latin American agreements, 
a topic that we revisit in the final chapter of this volume.
6. Industries without Smokestacks: A Different Path for Structural 
Transformation?
6.1. New and Different Trends for Africa’s Exports
As the studies in this volume make abundantly clear, the story of the increasing 
importance of industries without smokestacks unfolds mainly at the country 
level, as each country takes advantage of its particular opportunities. But are the 
trends evident in some countries becoming important for the continent as 
whole? Though data are limited and often spotty, we were able to construct a 
picture of changes in export portfolios measured in current dollars for 33 of 51 
SSA countries over the period 2002–15.9 Since mineral exports, including 
petroleum and mining exports, grew rapidly during the period—and these tend 
to dominate export performance, particularly for the large exporters (e.g., South 
Africa and Nigeria)—we have backed out mineral exports from the calculations. 
In addition, we use unweighted averages to  (p.20) focus on changes in the non-
mineral export basket of countries irrespective of size. This exploratory exercise 
surfaces some noteworthy trends for the region as a whole:
• Comparing unweighted averages across countries, industries 
without smokestacks (IWSS) sectors grew more rapidly than non-
mineral exports on average and were thus becoming more important 
as a share of export portfolios. This is evident in the shift upwards of 
the curve in Figure 1.4. A point to note is that these curves reflect 
averages and there is considerable variation around in both years.
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• Changes were most dramatic for small and medium sized exporting 
countries, such Lesotho (LSO), Sierra Leone (SLE), and Burkina Faso 
(BFA) (Figure 1.5). Several large exporters, even those predominantly 
exporting minerals, also registered large gains in the share of IWSS 
activities as a share of their non-mineral export baskets—including 
Nigeria (NGA), Angola (AGO), and Zimbabwe (ZWE). The changes 
were notable if less pronounced in several mid-sized exporters, such 
as Senegal (SEN), Ethiopia (ETH), and Kenya (KEN).
• All in all, the IWSS sectors performed better than other non-mineral 
exports in more than half of the 33 countries in 2002–15, and 
performed the same or better in nearly two-thirds (Figure 1.5).
• Industries without smokestacks grew more rapidly for the average 
African country as evidenced in the unweighted change in export 
baskets.  (p.21) IWSS activities rose from 51 per cent of the average 
non-mineral portfolio to more than 58 per cent over the 2002–15 
period (Table 1.1). While agro-processing rose slightly, horticulture 
held about constant, services exports, particularly tourism and 
transport, were the dominant driving force within the IWSS sectors. 
This was at the expense of declines in agriculture and other (non-
IWSS) services. Manufacturing held about constant. Within 
manufacturing, textile tended to fall as a share of the nonmineral 
total while other manufacturing tended to increase.
Table 1.1. Industries without smokestacks are a growing 
segment of exports
2002 2015
Average Share of Non-Mineral Exports
Average Export Share IWSS 51% 58%
Share IWSS Agro-Processing 22% 24%
Share IWSS Horticulture 3% 3%
Share IWSS Services 26% 30%
Average Export Share NonIWSS 49% 42%
Share Other Agriculture 10% 7%
Share Other Manufacturing 33% 33%
Share Other Services 6% 3%
Source: Steenbergen (2018) a/Average unweighted share of 
33 countries, excluding oil and minerals.
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Figure 1.4.  IWSS sectors become more 
important in African non-mineral exports
Figure 1.5.  The IWSS exports 
outstripped other non-mineral exports in 
most of SSA
 (p.22) While the more 
interesting developments are 
occurring at the country level 
as shown in chapters that 
follow, the role of agro-
processing, horticulture, ICT, 
tourism, transport, and other 
services is becoming more 
important in many countries 
across the continent—not just in 
a few middle-income countries 
but even in the small countries 
and large mineral exporting 
countries.
6.2. Implications for Productivity 
Growth
Resource endowments, the 
rapid growth of industries 
without smokestacks and the 
possibility of ‘premature 
deindustrialization’ have 
important implications for the 
changing structure of Africa’s 
economies. It is highly likely 
that, due to differences in 
endowments and trade 
opportunities, African countries 
will see a higher share of 
extractive industries, agro-
industry, and tradable services 
in the course of their structural transformation than was present in Asia’s newly 
industrializing economies.
The question, then, is to the extent to which these industries without 
smokestacks can play the role in structural transformation historically played by 
manufacturing. The answer depends on the characteristics of both existing 
manufacturing and of the new activities. In cases where the manufacturing 
sector exhibits little employment or productivity growth while services or agro-
industrial productivity and employment are growing, these sectors can lead 
growth enhancing structural change.
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Hoekman dispels the notion that services growth implies lower productivity 
growth: ‘Services lend themselves just as much to productivity growth as do 
manufactured goods production … Within services resource allocation shifts are 
a driver of productivity growth in the same way as in goods-producing sectors.’ 
A growing body of literature supports the view that where the service sector has 
the dynamic characteristics attributed to manufacturing in the past—strong 
linkages, productivity increases, and technological innovations—it can act as an 
engine of growth.10 Several modern service sectors—such as ICT services, 
financial services, transport, and logistics—have broadened the definition of the 
leading sector and contributed to structural transformation in a number of 
countries, taking up the role held by manufacturing in the past (Timmer and De 
Vries 2009; Lavopa and Szirmai 2014; Lavopa 2015b).
There is some evidence that in Africa services are taking up the role as the 
primary source of within-sector productivity growth. An ODI team calculated the 
contribution of services to annual labour productivity growth for some twenty-
five African countries over the period 1991–2013. They found that in 15 
countries, services accounted for more than 50 per cent of labour  (p.23) 
productivity growth. In countries as diverse as Botswana, Rwanda, Cape Verde, 
and Zambia, productivity growth in services accounted for more than 80 per 
cent of annual labour productivity growth (Balchin et al. 2016: 14). The 
Rwandan case, elaborated by Ggombe and Newfarmer, highlights the 
contribution of structural change from agriculture to services to the country’s 8 
per cent growth over the last two decades. Ellis, McMillan, and Silver find that 
labour productivity increased modestly in informal manufacturing and services 
firms in Tanzania.
In Chapter 17, John Spray and Sebastian Wolf use transaction-level data from 
the value-added tax (VAT), Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) and Customs declarations 
submitted to tax authorities to study the population of formal enterprises in 
Uganda and Rwanda between 2010 and 2014–15. They find that service 
industries make up most of the top 30 industries in terms of labour productivity 
in both countries: 17 out of the top 30 industries in Uganda, and 21 out of the 
top 30 in Rwanda. In Uganda marine aquaculture, post-harvest crop activities, 
and marine fishing rank among the highest productivity sectors in the economy 
and in Rwanda one agri-business ranks among the top 30.
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Spray and Wolf find that on average firms are larger in industries with high 
labour productivity, suggesting that scale is important not only in the 
manufacturing sector, but also in industries such as agri-business and services. 
They also find that find that, like manufacturing, services are distinct in their 
interconnectivity to the rest of the economy. Service sectors make up six of the 
top ten most interconnected sectors of the economy in Uganda and five in 
Rwanda, suggesting that services are vital to knitting the economy together. 
They further show that productivity growth in these sectors is strongly 
associated with the performance of the economy as a whole.
7. Conclusions
Taken together, the studies in this volume suggest that a broader definition of 
the higher productivity ‘modern sector’ is needed in thinking about structural 
transformation in Africa. Modern, tradable services, such as ICT-based services, 
tourism, and transport and logistics, have the potential for strong within-sector 
productivity change and contribute to raising productivity in other sectors of the 
economy. Agro-industrial production and horticulture offer the potential for 
productivity growth and exports. Some of these industries have the capacity to 
absorb large shares of Africa’s growing urban labour force. In short, it is 
possible that industries without smokestacks offer the potential for a new—or at 
least complementary—path towards structural transformation.
 (p.24) That said, it is important not to overlook manufacturing, which has in 
recent years been growing at more than 7 per cent per year in several countries 
including Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. In 
some of these economies smokestack industry may emerge to lead a more 
traditional pattern of structural transformation. Even in these cases, services 
will have an important role in raising the productivity of manufacturing, and 
agro-industry and horticulture can also support the transformation processes 
discussed here.
One of the main messages of this book is that the successful African economy of 
the twenty-first century is unlikely to look like the successful East Asian 
economy of the twentieth. It will be more diverse and draw on a broader range 
of high productivity economic activities for sustained growth. Nonetheless, 
significant policy challenges stand between today’s opportunities and our 
optimistic vision for tomorrow. These are the subject of the concluding chapter.
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Notes:
(1) See, for example, Baumol (1985) and Bhagwati (1984).
(2) Excluding South Africa from the average.
(3) Dani Rodrik (2016) coined the term ‘premature deindustrialization’. It should 
be recognized that even though the share of manufacturing in GDP may be 
falling (and pre-maturely), the sector may be growing. Hallward-Dreimeier and 
Nayyar (2017) point out that for all developing countries with data, some three-
quarters had falling shares of manufacturing in GDP in 1994–2014, but only 12 
countries had contractions of the manufacturing sector. Most of these 
experienced war or severe social conflict (e.g. Syria). The only African country 
among the 12 was Zimbabwe; see Hallward-Dreimeier and Nayyar (2017: 55–7).
(4) To arrive at these numbers, they looked at disaggregated trade statistics for 
major products and crossed these findings with findings from input-output 
tables. They found that intermediate goods trade is growing at about the same 
pace as all trade, so the trend did not affect the final composition of OECD 
merchandise trade. Services exhibit a different pattern, as services 
intermediates were indeed a faster growth segment of the market. These shares 
are considerably larger than those found in other studies, arguably because of 
their more comprehensive methodology.
(5) See Hoekman (2015).
(6) See Puga and Venables (1996).
(7) See Humphrey and Memedovic (2006).
(8) See Chapter 5 in this volume.
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(9) Working with the authors, Victor Steenbergen (2018) put together a detailed 
global data set relying on COMTRADE (https://comtrade.un.org/data/) for 
merchandise exports at the two-digit-level, and the WTO (https://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/statis_e/trade_datasets_e.htm) for an EBOPS-classification of 
services exports across all 51 SSA countries. Thirty-three countries had 
sufficiently disaggregated data over the period to construct a comprehensive 
panel for 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2015 at the two-digit level. (In a few cases 
where 2015 data were missing, he used 2014 or 2016 numbers.) He classified 
each HS-level and each service sector as an ‘IWSS sector’ according to whether 
they (a) were tradable; (b) had a relatively high value added per worker; (c) 
benefit from technological change and productivity growth; and (d) had some 
promise of scale and/or agglomeration economies. IWSS sectors included HS03–
08; 11–24 (food processing and horticulture); and services sectors S205–245 
(travel, transportation and communication); S253–268 (financial services 
computer informational services, and business services). Omitted were 
traditional products including agriculture, manufacturing, textiles, footwear, 
metal fabrication, and machinery as well as construction services, recreational 
services, and government services.
(10) See for example Lavopa (2015a), Szirmai (2012a), Szirmai and Verspagen 
(2015), and Tregenna (2015).
